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China’s Global Connectivity Politics 
On Confidently Dealing with Chinese Initiatives 
Paul J. Kohlenberg and Nadine Godehardt 
European attitudes towards China and its Belt and Road Initiative are changing. 
While the People’s Republic under Xi Jinping is the only country in the world pur-
suing a global vision, distrust of China’s expanding influence is growing. As a con-
sequence, the European debate about China is becoming increasingly emotional 
with interpretations fluctuating between alarmism and reassurance. Ideas about 
the ‘essence of China’ and expectations that the country should fit into the liberal 
order according to Western standards, however, threaten to limit Europe’s scope 
of action in dealing with the People’s Republic. In order to develop strategies for a 
confident German and European policy, China’s current global political approach 
should be considered systematically. Based on the features of China’s ‘connectivity 
politics’ (Konnektivitätspolitik), Germany and the EU could formulate policy options 
that go far beyond the realm of infrastructure. 
 
Under President Xi Jinping, China has estab-
lished a distinct and global form of connec-
tivity politics. This includes investment in 
infrastructure and international lending, 
broadening cooperation with and influenc-
ing institutions in research, finance and 
policy-making, acquiring international 
media houses and disseminating technical 
and regulatory standards. Thus, connectivity 
politics is driven by China’s strategic under-
standing that power and connectivity are 
closely interlinked (see SWP Comment 13/ 
2018). From Beijing’s point of view, political 
room for manoeuvre stems less from a new, 
authoritarian “sharp power”, as is currently 
being discussed in the US, but rather from 
the consistent enforcement of proactive 
‘connectivity power’. The more connectivity 
resources an actor gains, the more potential 
power he acquires to directly or indirectly 
influence other actors. So (initially), no dis-
tinction is made between forums and chan-
nels of connectivity. Instead, the motto 
‘a lot helps a lot’ applies here. As a result, 
Beijing also uses its relations with Western 
states and institutions of the liberal order 
to expand its connectivity resources. 
However, this is not compatible with 
the rather static idea that China can be inte-
grated into an existing liberal international 
order without it changing. China’s eco-
nomic rise and steadily expanding global 
range is changing the liberal system itself. 
Irrespective of the West’s hopes for domes-
tic liberalization in the People’s Republic, 
the participation of an authoritarian state 
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with China’s clout and size clearly has an 
impact on the existing international order. 
Although liberal standards and principles 
continue to apply, at the same time, exist-
ing rules are being questioned, other per-
spectives presented, existing institutions 
criticized or new ones created. Whether it 
concerns criteria for granting development 
loans or regulating the cyberspace of the 
future: China’s proactive connectivity 
politics are transforming the universe of 
what is possible and legitimate. 
Features of China’s 
Connectivity Politics 
Proactivity (zhudongxing) 
The Chinese approach to connectivity poli-
tics is often tied to the notion of ‘strategic 
docking’. It refers to how and in what way 
connections are established. Only by being 
proactive is it possible to pre-set the agenda 
of newly created connections and determine 
the points of contact with other actors 
and states. As a result, asymmetries can be 
strengthened in favour of the proactive actor 
in a connective relationship. Demands for 
new connections to be reciprocal are largely 
beside the point because the proactive side, 
in our case China, has, from the beginning, 
defined the fundamentals of the connection 
in its favour. According to US economist 
Jennifer M. Harris, ever-closer ties between 
US and Chinese companies in the obligato-
ry form of joint ventures are threatening to 
suppress internal US calls for more formal 
reciprocity. It has also been noted that 
Western companies active in China tend to 
temper their criticism of legal and political 
developments in the country. Consequent-
ly, widespread Western hopes that more 
connections and partnerships inevitably 
generate more reciprocity due to increasing 
interconnectedness, have been dashed. 
Proactivity is a key aspect of connectivity 
politics because it can be asserted in politi-
cal rhetoric that one’s own foreign policy is 
committed to the idea of ‘openness’. As soon 
as the other party rejects China’s offers, Bei-
jing can portray these actors as isolationist 
and therefore destabilizing the global econo-
my. As a result, China uses every political 
opportunity to actively define what open-
ness means. China is also pursuing this 
strategy beyond the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) and attempting to involve more and 
more countries using the key phrases ‘open-
ness’ and ‘expanding the circle of friends’ 
among groups such as the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. 
Multidimensionality (duowei lianjie) 
In the countless documents on the BRI, 
connectivity is usually broken down into 
specific thematic areas. However, inter-
actions between the dimensions of different 
technological layers and geographic spaces, 
such as economic corridors, supply chains, 
transit regions and cities, underwater cables, 
mobile networks and satellites, are far more 
important. Individual Chinese projects, 
often criticized as unprofitable by foreign 
commentators, follow a different logic from 
China’s perspective, depending on which 
geographic and technical dimensions are 
jointly relevant. It is a matter of construct-
ing new ecosystems that, once intercon-
nected, establish new geographic and politi-
cal spaces. For example, China is focussing 
much of its attention on port cities along 
the new Silk Road routes. This is not only 
a question of consolidating logistics routes, 
but also about creating the conditions to 
push forward new technical standards, such 
as data transmission, over the long term. 
‘Standards’ does not necessarily mean that 
they are Chinese patents. It could also mean 
that Chinese companies gain a dominant 
market position in distributing new technol-
ogies, such as 5G mobile communications. 
As a consequence, this interplay of the 
different dimensions within China’s con-
nectivity politics can also create new geo-
graphic regions. They may not be easily 
depicted on maps (as in the case of ‘smart 
cities’), but grow more closely together as 
transnational networks. This applies, for 
example, to flagship projects pursued by 
China in its Belt and Road Initiative, such 
as in Duisburg or Gwadar (Pakistan). These 
projects are supposed to lay the tracks for 
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new technical developments. Against this 
backdrop, global investment and company 
acquisitions are intended to ensure that 
practices and standards shaped by China 
can find future clients and be implemented 
globally. 
Discourse power (huayuquan) 
The (Chinese) term ‘discourse power’ is 
currently dominating a large number of 
political science publications in China, 
more than other notions of power, such as 
“soft” or “sharp power”. Discourse power 
has both a practical and an ideational-
strategic component. Its practical side is 
intended to result in better communication 
channels and platforms. For Xi Jinping, the 
further development of technical innova-
tions in the cyber sector has particular 
priority here. At the same time, China’s 
foreign investment in media houses, think-
tank partnerships and research projects is 
not only intended to influence news con-
tent and debates. It also wants to determine 
rules and procedures for political discus-
sions that are advantageous to Beijing in 
the long term. In addition, organizations 
of the existing liberal world order play an 
important role, for example the United 
Nations. Representatives of Beijing are 
deliberately trying to place Chinese policy 
formulations in UN bodies. 
In an ideational-strategic sense, discourse 
power is, therefore, also based on proactive, 
ideational connectivity. For example, Beijing 
carefully considers which concepts and 
ideas of the Western liberal world order can 
be linked to China’s own ‘discourse system’. 
More neutral terms such as ‘openness’ and 
‘inclusiveness’ or China’s efforts against 
‘deglobalization’ do not only act as mere 
hinges between different political value 
systems. Unlike with more predefined 
terms such as ‘democracy’, ‘reciprocity’ or 
‘human rights’, China sees an opportunity 
here to influence the use of these newer 
terms in the West as well. 
For strategic planners in Beijing, ex-
changes with countries in Latin America or 
Eastern Europe are particularly promising 
as they are seen as less firmly anchored in 
the liberal value system. This suggests that 
China intends to limit the territorial reach 
of the liberal system in the long term. 
According to Beijing’s interpretation, parts 
of Latin America or Eastern Europe should 
no longer be located in the global West. 
Internationalizing implicit (Party) 
rules (qian guize) 
China has preferred a more informal tem-
plate for establishing connections in its 
initiatives. These include numerous match-
making trade fairs between Chinese busi-
nesses and local companies to establish 
initial contact in new partner countries. If 
the contact is formalized or institutional-
ized, foreign actors in China are confronted 
not only with (state) law, but also with the 
rules, standards and institutions of the 
Communist Party. However, Party cells in 
Chinese companies and Sino-foreign joint 
ventures can come to the fore after a de-
layed period of time. Only then does it 
become clear that, for example, they in-
fluence corporate and human resource deci-
sions. This is a profound change because 
the Party’s prerogatives, such as data pro-
tection and access to information, take 
precedence over existing contracts and 
agreements. In terms of its general ap-
proach to connectivity, this means the legal 
nature of links with China may change over 
time. Beijing has announced it will set up 
its own international arbitration tribunals 
for disputes over investments related to the 
Belt and Road Initiative. This makes such 
implicit shifts in the legal logic more likely 
in the long term because China has enough 
leverage over many actors to force them to 
accept particular dispute resolution forums. 
Conclusion 
Beijing’s authoritarian leadership cannot 
decide alone with whom, through what and 
how its connectivity-centred approach to 
global politics is to be implemented. There-
fore, the above description of the features 
of China’s approach is not intended as an 
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appeal to European actors to copy Beijing’s 
strategies. 
To take advantage of their options for 
action (see table), German and European 
policymakers and experts should take into 
account four guiding principles. First, they 
should avoid making premature judge-
ments and adopting overly static views of 
Chinese politics. Second, it is better to focus 
on the strengths of democracy, in particular 
its culture and spirit of intense, disputa-
tious, public debate, its transparency and 
perseverance. Third, it is essential that the 
public sphere and democratic discourse are 
given a similar status as critical infrastruc-
ture. Although Chinese positions are also to 
be included here, allowing Chinese-driven 
censorship to take hold in Germany and the 
EU should be avoided. Fourth, it is appro-
priate to establish individuals’ data protec-
tion as a basis of liberal foreign policy. For 
example, the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation could be applied to the activities 
of Chinese technology groups such as 
Baidu, Alibaba or Tencent (BAT). In dealing 
with Chinese initiatives, German and Euro-
pean politics do not, therefore, have to 
become ‘Chinese’ but they must, above all, 
become more confident. 
 
European Union Fields of Action 
European Code of Conduct on openness, 
reciprocity and transparency in dealing 
with foreign direct investment. 
 
Rethinking connectivity as a complex set 
of issues: recognizing cross-connections 
between cyberspace, mobility, communica-
tion, the power grid and others as regulatory 
spaces and shaping them politically. 
 
Using China’s national isolationism to 
legitimize more robust measures. For 
example: ensure free communication (i.e. 
without censorship) on Chinese communi-
cation apps if their users are in the EU. 
Options for Action  
with respect to China 
Provide targeted support to Chinese 
initiatives based on liberal standards. For 
example: the operating mode of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, China’s 
peacekeeping efforts. 
 
Concentrated and sustained analysis of 
Chinese terms and concepts. For example: 
Chinese interpretation of ‘deglobalization’, 
reinterpretation of terms such as ‘openness’. 
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